




An Intelligent Conversation over Dinner 
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“There was no friend of Kant’s but considered the day on which he was to dine with 
him as a day of festal pleasure.” 
                                                Thomas de Quincey, The Last Days of Immanuel Kant 
 
- Why are people these days so interested in comparing food with works of art, and 
in turning cooks into artists? I remember a ghastly and very successful television 
series with someone called Oliver Peyton who travels around the world and tries to 
make a case for cooking as  fine art, though the premise of the series is that it is all a 
foregone conclusion and that a cook who makes a dish look like a painting by 
Matisse must be an artist indeed. Sometimes there is a reactionary cultural critic in 
me who wonders whether the inclusion of cooking in the domain of fine arts is not a 
symptom of the end of art or of a pseudo-democratic politics that refuses to make 
distinctions because making a distinction would amount to an authoritarian 
imposition. Even if a number of analogies between cooking and creating art can be 
drawn, what difference do they make? The moves in this game are so predictable, 
that it is not to my taste. In my eyes, even the frisson to be gained from the “bodily 
awareness” of the moment “when a life and a death are commemorated in a taste”,1 
as Carolyn Korsmeyer puts it, seems to call for a surrealist bashing. Is it a 
coincidence that the ritual of eating fine food has provoked the subversive 
imagination of the likes of Luis Buñuel and Marco Ferreri, and that in La grande 
bouffe the saturation of bourgeois society and its self-consumption are depicted as 
the suicidal orgy of four indulging gourmets?  
- Please switch off the television. Before you ramble on, allow me to remind you of a 
rather trivial observation. Some of the finest food critics are also excellent and sharp-
eyed writers, writers who display wit, irony, and invention and have a real moral 
sensitivity rather than a fondness for tasteful things. In Spain, two names come to 
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mind immediately, Álvaro Cunqueiro and Nèstor Luján. In a portrait of his friend the 
Catalan composer Xavier Montsalvatge, Luján once wrote the fine sentence: “We 
were young at the same time and decided to be young forever.”2 And in his 
ingenious novel Un hombre que se parecía a Orestes, a literary feast in which the 
author demonstrates that nothing can take place if it must take place, or that the 
inevitable must fall prey to an endless deferral, to vicariousness, Galician gourmet 
Cunqueiro imagines a barefoot and barelegged maid who serves dinner to a 
travelling king and smiles at him gracefully. The king interprets her gesture as an 
invitation to join her later on “but prefers to preserve the affair in the guise of a 
dream”3 so as to feel accompanied during the long wintry nights he will spend alone 
in his kingdom.  
- The philosopher Kant distinguishes, as is well known, between two forms of taste, a 
taste for the agreeable and a taste for the beautiful. What is agreeable to me may 
not be so straight away, and sometimes great cooking consists in preparing a dish 
that does not allow me to decide whether what I am meant to eat is agreeable to me 
or not, is delicious or disgusting. Delight in tasting and eating such a dish then 
depends on an experience of undecidability, and the more I feel surprised by what I 
put in my mouth, the more difficult it is to anticipate whether I will swallow it or spit it 
out. I suppose that this is one meaning of what Korsmeyer calls “terrible eating”. If 
the agreeable, no matter how complicated it may prove to determine its actual 
condition or to trace its experience, is to be distinguished from the beautiful, from a 
feeling of pleasure that Kant describes as a feeling of life, or as the experience of a 
heightened intensity, then a criterion is required that will also allow us to distinguish 
between the craft or the technique of cooking and the creation of a work of art; for a 
work of art provokes the same kind of intensity a beholder experiences when 
contemplating beauty in nature. This criterion is disinterestedness. Inasmuch as 
tasting a dish prepared by an exceptionally innovative and skilled cook, by a cook 
who literally surpasses himself, involves not only touching it with the tongue but also 
swallowing it, digesting it, and ultimately evacuating its residues, there can be no 
gastronomy that would not be guided by an interest. Conversely, inasmuch as 
appreciating a work of art created by an exceptionally innovative and skilled artist, by 
a genius, as Kant says, involves contemplation, an impossibility of touching the 
                                                
2 Nèstor Luján, El túnel dels anys 40. Memòria personal, Barcelona 1994, p. 56. 




object, not because of its physical properties or a conventional prohibition but 
because of its condition as a work of art, the interest or intention that must guide the 
artist and that communicates itself to the beholder remains subordinated to a more 
fundamental disinterestedness, or at least it remains embedded within an irreducible 
tension that separates it from art’s rejection of any instrumental use that could be 
made of it. 
- When you speak of a tension here, I assume that you are alluding to Kant’s 
definition of participation in art. For according to the Critique of Judgement, 
participation in art demands both an awareness of art as art, or an interest, and 
some sort of suspension of disbelief: one must consider the work of art “as if” it were 
a product of nature, not simply as an artifact produced by an artist. In a sense, the 
work of art is always more than simply an artifact precisely because in order to be 
innovative the artist must allow for his skills and his knowledge to be invalidated. It is 
nature that provides him with the rules he must apply, Kant stipulates. This double 
demand without which there is no participation in art brings forth a tension between 
interest and disinterestedness. 
- But then, following your argument, I could still claim that there can be an important 
affinity, a family resemblance, between, on the one hand, the gourmet and the 
beholder of a work of art, and, on the other hand, the cook and the artist. All that 
would be needed would be to imagine a gourmet who behaves like a wine-taster, 
though for reasons that would not be pragmatic. The gourmet who wants cooking to 
be an art, in Kant’s terminology a fine or a free art, must always spit out whatever 
morsel he has placed in his mouth. He must discard the food before it starts to 
disintegrate, to melt in the warm cavity, to nourish; if he wishes to belong to the 
family of artists and of beholders of art, he must let go. Excrement is the gourmet’s 
betrayal of art. Accordingly, the cook’s artistic talent must consist in the ability to 
cook a dish that the diner is not able to swallow even though no physical property of 
this dish prevents him from doing so. The artist’s menu can only be one of de-
gustation. As an artist, the master of the kitchen must put the diner in a position 
where he can feel something like an enabling or inviting disgust that has ceased to 
be a mere “sensation”. This is difficult because taste, touching something with one’s 
tongue, excludes distance: “Objects of taste are always literally close to one.”4  
                                                




- In a sense, then, spitting out the morsel is analogous to actively preserving the 
letter in one’s relationship to art. For the actively preserved letter is protected against 
dissolving in the meaning of an interpretation. What keeps gastronomy, at least in so 
many of its traditional forms, at bay from art is that it has not understood the 
importance and the value of not doing something, regardless of the fact that its 
exploits depend on hunger having been satisfied. If the population is starving, 
gastronomy has not much of a place. 
- I ask myself whether your argument does not rely on a concept of art that is 
incompatible with the achievements of modern and contemporary art since it seems 
to be entirely determined by the idea of contemplation and therefore, as you 
mentioned in the beginning, by an experience of beauty, or of the aesthetic. 
Perhaps, if we were to choose a different approach, one that would not exclude 
participation as constitutive of a specific art practice, we could reach a different 
conclusion as to the relationship between art and cooking. 
- Please keep such stereotypical objections to yourself. Let me continue with my 
argument on a more general level. Taste, as conceived in the wake of Kant, would 
be a concept incompatible not only with barbarism but also with culture. The 
barbarian is the one who has only one goal in mind, appropriation by swallowing. He 
follows the logic of desire. Ultimately, he does not care what he eats as long as he 
keeps eating, and this is why he can never put an end to his activity, reproducing his 
desire as he satisfies it. His is a form of addiction, or perhaps addiction is the form 
barbarism adopts in culture. Interestingly, when Deleuze discusses the habit of 
drinking in the conversations with Claire Parnet he recorded for television, he claims 
that the alcoholic does not aim for one last drink; rather he aims for the penultimate 
drink, given that the last drink would lead to his collapse and hence interrupt his 
addiction. I would be tempted to say that to the extent that the addict must learn the 
virtue of asceticism for him to be an addict, there is already some culture in 
addiction, something which exceeds barbarism, an element of refinement or indeed 
of taste. Unbeknown to himself, the addict is already on the way. Yet taste is 
incompatible with culture, too, with any established set of rules and conventions to 
be applied in a variety of social situations. Taste is not an item of knowledge, to be 
catalogued in the archives, and it is here that lies its proximity – art’s proximity – to 
thought. Taste is distant twice over, once with regard to appropriation, and then 




with regard to first nature, then in view of second nature. Perhaps, then, taste is 
neither something natural nor something cultural. Such an understanding of taste 
means that the aesthetic has a paradigmatic dimension, or that all taste is 
intrinsically aesthetic. 
- Even in modern and contemporary art, participation is kept apart from the event 
itself, from the art practice that includes it at the same time as a defining element. Art 
is untouchable by definition, and when the art work calls for touching, touch is 
transformed. In art, whether contemporary or not, there can only be touching without 
touching. It is not by chance, not out of an arbitrary whim, that we hesitate to touch a 
sculpture. All participation presupposes a caesura, otherwise there is nothing in 
which one can participate. When it comes to art, though, the interruption is 
prescribed by the object itself, an essential moment of any possible relationship to it. 
Iconoclasm is always incapable of bridging the gap, of annulling the distancing effect 
that puts art out of reach for the destructive gesture that tries to grasp and seize the 
work. What does this mean? It means that art is a matter of freedom and truth, of 
what comes to us and imposes itself upon us to the extent that we let it come to us. I 
am paraphrasing Heidegger’s phenomenological interpretation of Kant here. Art has 
to do with the fact that something comes to us in the first place. 
- Imposition is the clue that prompts me to explore taste from the angle of disgust. 
Surely, if we stay with Kant, what causes disgust is also meant to be what resists 
artistic representation and thus aesthetic taste. In his essay Economimesis, Derrida 
shows how disgust functions as the negative other that renders Kant’s thoughts on 
aesthetic taste coherent. It is only when this other, or whatever it is that triggers 
disgust, no longer lets itself be identified and disrupts the coherence of thought, that 
aesthetic taste is truly challenged, as if disgust were the subjective response to a 
breakdown of identification and to a boundless generalisation of vicariousness: “The 
system has an interest in determining the other as its other, that is as literally 
disgusting.”5 Yet how, exactly, does Kant introduce the notion of disgust? Disgust is, 
he writes, a “sensation” based on “nothing but imagination”. We experience an object 
as disgusting when it imposes itself upon us, insisting violently on our enjoyment of it 
because we reject it with equal violence, so that, in the experience of disgust, we no 
longer distinguish between what is imaginary, a mere representation of the object, 
                                                




and what corresponds to the object’s very nature. Our sensation is a source and a 
product of confusion. When it comes to the pleasure we take in the work of art, the 
“as if” is designed to ward off such confusion. Kant adds that sculpture is a fine art 
that lends itself particularly to a mix up of the artifactual and the natural in sensation. 
Perhaps this explains our hesitation to touch a sculpture as much as our desire to 
feel it with our hands. So Kant’s comments on disgust suggest that when we are 
disgusted and, as a consequence, reject something, it is not clear that what we 
actually reject is the object that elicits our disgust; or, to put it differently, it is not 
clear that it is an object which elicits disgust. As much as the pleasure of beauty, or 
that feeling of life which amounts to a kind of self-affection of the subject, disgust, the 
sign of an ugliness that resists all attempts at representing it, is a subjective matter, a 
matter of the subject being at odds with himself. In disgust, it becomes apparent that 
the subject can put himself at risk, or that the feeling of life harbours a deadly 
madness, if madness is tantamount to the impossibility of making a distinction 
between nature and art, between what comes first and what comes second.  
- There would be then two forms of imposition. On the one hand, there would be the 
imposition of art on the beholder. The condition for art to impose itself upon us in 
aesthetic pleasure, or for aesthetic pleasure to be a free exposure to something that 
comes to us freely and bestows a sense of necessity on us, so that we cannot reject 
it and do not experience its coming as a violent intrusion, would be a distinction 
between art and nature that averts vicariousness and allows taste to remain 
irreducible to both nature and art. However, it must be noted that this distinction 
becomes all the more tenuous the more difficult it proves to understand the usage 
we must make of the “as if” when determining participation in art and considering art 
“as if” it were nature. On the other hand, though, there would also be the imposition 
of the subject of aesthetics onto itself, the suicide of the aesthetic. This imposition 
would destroy the pleasure of beauty, and hence beauty itself. It would stem from 
confusion and result in confusion, triggered by an imagination that would have 
refused to enter into harmonious and free play with the understanding, the other 
power of representation, to employ Kantian vocabulary. Everything would hinge on 
the imagination’s freedom, play itself out between a form that would remain at a 
distance and a form that would come too close to be enjoyable, as it were. What 
touches me can only do so if I do not feel that it seeks to touch me. Thus, pleasure in 




but also on it keeping the right distance, on it not trying to subordinate the 
understanding to its own blind purposes. In other words, the imagination’s freedom is 
always a double achievement, both in the sense of being already at work in this 
achievement and in the sense of being the achievement itself. It is this precedence 
or this subsequence of freedom, without which freedom cannot be conceived of, that 
threatens aesthetic taste and pleasure. 
- Contemplating beauty may not be as mechanical an activity as chewing and 
shitting, yet contemplation would be just as stupid if art did not demand to be seen 
as art, too. 
- Apparently aesthetic taste is not to be had easily! But does this warrant letting the 
cook in?  
- “Canary wine is agreeable.” 
- “It is agreeable to me.” 
